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MEMBER STATES’ LIABILITY FOR JUDICIAL ACTS OR OMISSIONS: MUCH ADO
ABOUT NOTHING?
CASE C-224/01 Gerhard Ko¨bler v. Republic of Austria is the ﬁrst
case before the European Court of Justice (‘‘the Court’’) on
Member State liability for judicial acts or omissions.
Mr. Ko¨bler applied for the length of service increment payable
to university professors in Austria. His application was dismissed
on the ground that he had not served ﬁfteen years in the Austrian
university system. Mr. Ko¨bler claimed that Austrian law was
contrary to Article 39 of the EC Treaty on the free movement of
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workers, as it did not take into account periods of service in other
Member States and was therefore discriminatory.
The Verwaltungsgerichtshof (the Austrian Administrative
Supreme Court) dismissed Mr. Ko¨bler’s claim. Mr. Ko¨bler
subsequently brought an action before the Landesgericht fu¨r
Zivilrechtssachen (the regional civil court) for damages against the
Republic of Austria in respect of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof ’s
decision. Several questions concerning the liability of the State for
judicial acts or omissions were referred to the Court.
Upholding Advocate General Le´ger’s Opinion, the Court
explicitly ruled for the ﬁrst time that national courts should not, in
principle, be immune from an action in damages as a result of their
acts or omissions. The State is a subject of international law and it
is viewed as a single entity, notwithstanding its internal division of
powers. Moreover, acknowledging the responsibility of national
courts is the necessary corollary of the important role that they
play in directly, immediately and eﬀectively protecting the rights
which individuals derive from Community law.
In line with previous case law on Member State liability, the
Court then conﬁrmed that three conditions had to be met for a
damages action against a Member State to succeed:
1. the rule in question must be intended to confer rights on
individuals,
2. the breach must be suﬃciently serious, and
3. there must be a direct causal link between the breach of
the obligation resting on the State and the damage
sustained by the injured party.
The Court ﬁnally held that, on the facts, Austria was not liable in
damages, as its breach of Article 39 was not suﬃciently serious.
This judgment raises several issues.
First, the question arises of how a suﬃciently serious breach
should be assessed. Both the Advocate General and the Court
agreed that the assessment of whether a breach was suﬃciently
serious should be particularly strict in relation to judicial acts, so as
to leave the necessary margin of discretion to national courts to
exercise their function eﬀectively. In particular, it appears that the
Court has limited the liability of national courts to courts of last
instance. Further, it held that State liability could be incurred only
in the exceptional case where the court had ‘‘manifestly infringed
the applicable law’’. The Court listed several factors which should
be considered in making this assessment of manifest infringement:
the degree of clarity and the precision of the rule infringed, whether
the infringement was intentional, the position taken by a
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Community institution, and the non-compliance by the national
court in question with its obligation to make a reference under
Article 234 of the Treaty. However, the application of these factors
to judicial acts or omissions is particularly controversial and
certainly not straightforward. Indeed, the Advocate General and
the Court applied a similar test but nonetheless reached a diﬀerent
outcome on the facts of the case. The duty which courts of last
instance have to refer questions of interpretation of Community law
under the third paragraph of Article 234 further complicates the
issue. More speciﬁcally, the question arises whether a national court
could commit a suﬃciently serious breach if it invoked the acte
clair doctrine in a case which did not satisfy the CILFIT criteria.
Obvious misuses of this doctrine would probably give rise to a
successful claim in damages. The widely discussed judgment of the
French Conseil d’Etat (the Administrative Supreme Court) in Cohn-
Bendit should fall within this category, especially as the Conseil
d’Etat had refused to follow the advice of its Commissaire du
Gouvernement to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court.
However, the question is arguably much more delicate when a
grossly negligent, as opposed to a wilful, misuse of the doctrine is
at stake.
Secondly, the requirement that there should be a direct causal
link is also likely to cause diﬃculties in claims concerning judicial
acts or omissions. If a national court has not applied Community
law when required to do so, the problem remains that it is still
necessary to determine the extent to which this failure has
contributed to the applicant’s loss. It may be that the contentious
question of Community law was only one question among several
others. In such a case, how can an individual establish
successfully that he would have been in another position if the
national court had referred the relevant preliminary questions to
the Court?
Finally, there is the question of practical enforcement. State
liability is a Community remedy which is enforced in national
courts. Thus, an individual who has suﬀered a loss as a result of
the act or omission of a court of last instance has to lodge a claim
in damages before a national court of ﬁrst instance. Serious
diﬃculties could arise if this lower court was somehow related to
the court of last instance which took the contentious decision in the
ﬁrst place. In other words, how could a lower court decide that
national law did not comply with a speciﬁc provision of
Community law if the court of last instance held that it did? Also,
how could a lower court rule that the acte clair doctrine did not
apply when the court of last instance held that it did? The diﬃculty
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involved in ﬁnding a suitable forum is exacerbated in Member
States with a strict doctrine of binding precedent. For example, is it
realistic to expect the High Court to rule that the House of Lords
committed ‘‘a manifest breach of Community law’’ and award
damages as a result? It is likely that High Court judges will
systematically either dismiss such claims in damages or refer them
to the Court under Article 234. Moreover, it can be doubted
whether an aggrieved individual could seriously contemplate
lodging an appeal against the damages judgment of the lower court
if that meant that he would have to appear before the higher court
against which his claim in damages was directed.
In Ko¨bler, the United Kingdom, which made some observations
to the Court, submitted that the question of enforcement was
highly problematic in the context of State liability for judicial acts
or omissions. In particular, it pointed to ‘‘the diﬃculties in
determining the court competent to adjudicate on such a case of
State liability, particularly in the United Kingdom where there is a
unitary court system and a strict doctrine of stare decisis’’.
However, the Court dismissed the argument by simply stating that
determining the competent court was a question for Member States
to resolve.
This judgment lays down a principle which ﬂows from the
Court’s previous case law and which unequivocally conﬁrms, ﬁrst,
that Member States are single entities and, secondly, that national
courts have a duty to ensure that Community law is upheld.
However, it is diﬃcult to assess, at this stage, whether the remedy
of State liability for judicial acts or omissions will have any
practical impact: not only is the Ko¨bler test extremely restrictive but
it is also unlikely to be applied in national courts. It is arguable
that Ko¨bler raises more questions than it provides answers.
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